Informers

The Gemara in Sanhedrin 58b says:

עובד כוכבים ששבת חייב מיתה שנא’ ויום ולילה לא ישבותו

A non-Jew that keeps Shabbat is liable to the death penalty as it is written “day and night he shall not rest”.

This seems quite radical and I think its good to remind oneself that when saying death penalty its likely to be an exaggerated form of speech, its not like they had the power to carry out such sentences.

Nonetheless it remains surprising, what is so bad about a non-Jew keeping Shabbat?

A Midrash has this Gemara in a slightly different fashion:

עובד כוכבים ששמר את השבת עד שלא קבל עליו את המילה חייב מיתה

A non-Jew that keeps the Shabbat is liable to the death penalty until the point that he accepts circumcision.

The addition is quite significant though, does this mean they should be converted first? The continuation of the Midrash however implies that this is not referring to conversion because it asks: “Why? They arent commanded on it?”

Rabbi Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg read a very interesting explanation of this midrash which he relates in his piece titled: “Whether its permissable to give a lecture on the judgements (laws) of Israel in front of a non-Jewish audience”.

He says:

ראיתי  לפני שלשים שנה ויותר בספר אחד שכתב בשם חכם אחד כי המאמרים בסנהדרין על עכו”ם ששבת ועל העוסק בתורה נאמרו נגד כת הנוצרים הראשונים שפרקו מעליהם ברית מילה אבל קיימו את השבת וגם עסקו בתורה והיו מזדווגן לבנ”י בשבת ומועד ושמעו כל דבריהם ואח”כ הלכו והלשינו עליהם בפני הרשות

More than 30 years ago I saw in a book written by a certain Rabbi that what they say in Sanhedrin on a non-Jew that keeps Shabbat and engages in Torah (that he is liable to the death penalty) was said regarding a sect of early Christians who cast off from themselves [the commandment] of circumcision, but fulfilled the Shabbat and also engaged in Torah, and they joined together with the Jews on Shabbat and holidays and they heard all of their words and afterwards went and tattled/informed on them with the government.

So according to this author the Gemara was reacting towards a particular series of events that took place in synagogue(s). This group of early Christians that were to some extent observing Torah were joining them – perhaps every once in a while or continually – on Shabbat and some day told the government about what the Jews were discussing, presumably phrased in ways that the government would be less pleased with.

Thats why the Midrash adds “until the point that he accepts circumcision” because that ensures the Gemara’s statement is restricted to that sect of early Christians and not to all non-Jews that desire to keep Shabbat. The obstacle is however quite significant, which ensures at the same time that it is accessible only to those that are very dedicated or those that are lucky to be circumcized by their parents already (though Im not sure this was common in the time of the Gemara like it is today).

I seem to recall this also the other way around, where the Jews were at a certain point in time distancing themselves from the early Christians before the government which was not appreciated by the early Christians. Perhaps someone recalls the event Im referring to. I think this is a rather interesting example also of the relatively late parting of the ways between Christianity and Judaism. Im not sure whether it can be imagined that (dedicated) Jews were attending the meetings of early Christians (in whatever fashion these took place) but the other way around seems certainly to have been the case even if it ended in this particular instance in a negative way.

BR: Marital Relations, Birth Control, and Abortion in Jewish Law

Marital Relations, Birth Control, and Abortion in Jewish Law

Author: David M. Feldman

Publisher: New York, Schocken Books, 1978

Pages: 322

A good friend gave me this book as a gift and after completing it I can say I could not have wished for a nicer gift. What follows below is a short summary and my thoughts.

Short summary:

The book is divided in 4 parts, the first being a summary of the structure of Jewish Law, from the Talmud up to the Responsa literature, which is quite helpful because the subsequent chapters assume an awareness of these sources and their order of importance. The second part is concerned with marital relations, the idea of marriage independent of procreation in both Jewish and Christian tradition, procreation itself, marital sex and the legitimacy of pleasure. Already in this part a strikingly different pattern emerges between the Jewish and Christian tradition, the former appearing quite accomodating to humankind’s desires and limitations, while the latter seems very much characterized by austerity and ascetic ideals. This difference in broad lines persists in the other two domains that make up the third and fourth part of the book as well.

The third part comprises questions and topics that deal directly and indirectly with the question of birth control. Discussions included are on improper emission of seed, the existence or non-existence of female seed and the destruction of seed as found in ‘the act of Er and Onan’. In all of this Feldman shows a familiarity with the sources (both Jewish and Christian) that is daunting, the footnotes are full with pearls and reveal a level of investigation that is hard to reach. The remainder of the third part is more directly focused on birth control; a classic passage from the Talmud is looked at from all directions and he spends no less than 30 pages detailing the responses of many Rishonim and Acharonim to it. This is because the talmudic passage lays the basis for other discussions on birth control and allows him to discuss variations on the principle he extracts, such as the use of a Diaphragm, Condom, Douche, the Pill, etc. In all of this he is careful to zoom in on issues but at the same time to put these particulars in their broader context. By doing this, he successfully provides a high-level of treatment of the topic but not one that is outside of the reach of the student who is less familiar with the way the Jewish legal process works.

The fourth and last part deals with the question of abortion. He starts by looking at the place of the foetus in Judaism and in Christianity and how foeticide has been dealt with. He then continues by discussing warrants for abortion, in particular therapeutic abortion (to save life) and ends with a discussion on non-therapeutic abortion. Much of this yields some very interesting insights and approaches that are often absent in today’s discussions on abortion.

The postscript contains a short excursus on birth control in which he veers from the strong focus on the legal considerations to a stronger focus on the moral realm and the following quote of his seems fitting to end this summary with: “”permitted” or “forbidden” in the final judgement of Jewish law codes tells only a small part of the story of Judaism’s attitude towards birth control. Much more significant material for the Jewish philosophy of marriage, sex, and moral decisions emerges from the process of the law, with its discussion of principles and analysis of factors involved.” (297) And this he successfully shows page after page.

My thoughts:

I thoroughly enjoyed this book and heartily recommend it to anyone interested in Jewish Law, comparative reference between Jewish and Christian tradition, or just interested in the topics he deals with. He covers about every source that one could think of and in all of this displays a remarkable sense of nuance and balance. This makes it in my opinion a work of great value and besides that probably the closest one can come to experiencing the halachic process in english, which alone makes it worth reading.

Grade:

10 out of 10

Torah and Non-Jews

Having studied quite a few articles and responsa on how a non-Jew is to relate to the Torah I think it would be nice to present some opinions. Especially since there seems to be quite some confusion on the internet as to a non-Jew’s relationship to the Torah and most discussions omit proper reference to the sources in the Jewish legal tradition. Credit for locating and teaching me all these sources goes to a good friend who is far more knowledgeable than I am.

Alot of halachic questions start with the Rambam and so will this post, specifically Hilchot Melachim Ch. 10:

The Rambam in Hilchot Melachim 10:9 says as following:

עכו”ם שעסק בתורה חייב מיתה. לא יעסוק אלא בשבע מצות שלהן בלבד. וכן עכו”ם ששבת אפילו ביום מימות החול. אם עשאהו לעצמו כמו שבת חייב מיתה. ואין צריך לומר אם עשה מועד לעצמו. כללו של דבר אין מניחין אותן לחדש דת ולעשות מצות לעצמן מדעתן. אלא או יהיה גר צדק ויקבל כל המצות. או יעמוד בתורתו ולא יוסיף ולא יגרע. ואם עסק בתורה. או שבת. או חדש דבר. מכין אותו ועונשין אותו. ומודיעין אותו שהוא חייב מיתה על זה אבל אינו נהרג

“An idol-worshipper that engages in Torah is liable to the death penalty. He should not engage [in the Torah] except for the 7 mitzvot alone. Similarly an idol-worshipper that rests even on a weekday. If he makes it to himself like a Shabbat he is liable to the death penalty. And its not necessary to say [that] if he makes it a festival to himself [it is also prohibited]. The general principle is that we dont allow him to invent religion and to do commandments that he made up. Rather either he becomes a convert and accepts all of the commandments. Or he stands in his Torah and does not add nor subtract. And if he engages in Torah or in Shabbat or invents a new thing, we lash him and punish him, and inform him that he is liable to the death penalty on this account but we dont kill him.”

In Hilchot Melachim 10:10, the very next halacha, he writes:

בן נח שרצה לעשות מצוה משאר מצות התורה כדי לקבל שכר. אין מונעין אותו לעשות כהלכתה. ואם הביא עולה מקבלין ממנו. נתן צדקה מקבלין ממנו. ויראה לי שנותנין אותה לעניי ישראל. הואיל והוא ניזון מישראל ומצוה עליהם להחיותו. אבל העכו”ם שנתן צדקה מקבלין ממנו ונותנין אותה לעניי עכו”ם

“A son of Noah that wants to do a commandment from the rest of the commandments of the Torah (i.e. other than the 7) in order to obtain reward, we dont prevent him to do so according to the halacha. And if he brought a sacrifice we accept it from him. If he gave charity, we accept it from him. And it appears to me that we give it to the poor of Israel. Since he is fed by Israel and we are commanded to sustain him. But an idol-worshipper that gave charity we accept it from him and give it to poor idol-worshippers.”

On these two halachot alot has been written and Ill try to give a glimpse in this post. It needs to be said that these arguments are often quite difficult and only come to their full force when read in their entirety. Hence if you are interested in learning more about this you would do well to look up the sources yourself.

There is an obvious discrepancy between the two halachot, in the one the Rambam seems to forbid any additional commandments while in the other he seems to allow it and even says theres reward for doing them.

The Radbaz, in his commentary to the Rambam solves the discrepancy as following:

ואם רצה לעשות באומרו שנצטוה עליה אין מניחין אותו לעשותה אלא אם עשאה כדי לקבל עליה שכר כמי שאינו מצווה ועושה וכן דקדק רבינו וכתב כדי לקבל שכר. ומ”מ במצות שצריכין קדושה וטהרה כגון תפילין ס”ת ומזוזה אני חוכך להחמיר שלא יניחו אותם לעשותן

“And if he wants to do [the additional commandments] while saying that it was commanded to them we dont allow him to do [them] rather if he does them in order to obtain reward like one who is not commanded but does [we allow it], and thus our master was precise and wrote “in order to obtain reward”. Nevertheless regarding the commandments that require holiness and purity like Tefilin, Torah scrolls and Mezuzah I argue to be stringent that they should not allow them to do them.”

So according to the Radbaz halacha 9 applies to one that thinks he is obligated to do certain additional commandments, while halacha 10 applies to one who realizes he is not obligated to do these additional comandments but nevertheless aspires to them in order to obtain reward.

The Avnei Shoham disagrees with the Radbaz and says this distinction on basis of intention is not found anywhere in halacha, and in addition to this he argues that this distinction could not explain the situation of Avraham Avinu, who is said to have kept the whole Torah but certainly did not act for reward. He reads the Rambam in a different way: halacha 9 refers to a person who does commandments he made up himself while halacha 10 refers to a person who does commandments that are among the 613. This is why the Rambam wrote in halacha 9 “we dont allow him to invent religion and to do commandments that he made up” while in halacha 10 he wrote “a commandment from the rest of the commandments of the Torah”. According to the Avnei Shoham, exceptions to this rule are engaging in Torah, keeping Shabbat and sacrifices other than the burnt offering.

R. Moshe Feinstein explains the Rambam in a very different way; he says a non-Jew has no possibility to do any additional commandments at all (except for bringing certain sacrifices and giving charity) and thus theres no reward either. In his opinion by saying “in order to obtain reward” the Rambam is not conceding that non-Jews get reward on additional commandments but is just explaining the intention of the non-Jew (which is false). Interestingly in another teshuva of his on whether non-Jews are commanded in prayer he does seem to agree with the Radbaz’s reading and says non-Jews can voluntarily pray when not in distress (which is optional to them) and get reward for it like one who is not commanded but does.

The Chatam Sofer comes to a very different conclusion, he says:

ועיין רמב”ם פ׳ יוד ממלכים ה׳ ט׳ וה׳ יוד שנראה שמחלק בין עכו״ם לבן נח שאותו קיבל עליו שלא לעע״ז וזה מותר לשבות ולקיים המצות שירצה ומזה מקבלים קרבנות ומלמדים לו תורה ומקבלים ממש צדקה והשתא לק״מ מגוי ששבת מי איכא מידי דהרי גם גוי אם אינו עע״ז מותר לשבות

“And see the Rambam in Hilchot Melachim 10:9 and :10, that it appears that he distinguishes between an idol-worshipper and a son of Noah, that one accepted on himself not to worship idols and to this one its permitted to rest (keep Shabbat) and to fulfill the commandments that he desires and from him we accept sacrifices and we teach him Torah and accept literally from him charity and now there is no question at all from the case of a non-Jew that rests on Shabbat — is there any problem? — since behold also a non-Jew, if he does not worship idols is allowed to rest on Shabbat.”

So the Chatam Sofer thinks the discrepancy can be solved by focusing on the word that is used by the Rambam in referring to non-Jews. In halacha 9 its ‘idol-worshipper’ while in halacha 10 its ‘son of Noah’. To be sure the Rambam is careful with his wording so this might be the solution, however R. Twersky notes that in the Rambam’s teshuva regarding whether a Jew can circumcize a non-Jew he does not distinguish between idol-worshipper or son of Noah

It is quite striking though that the Chatam Sofer goes as far as saying that a non-Jew that accepts the 7 commandments can perform any additional commandment he desires

Arriving at a similar conclusion from a very different angle is the Chemdat Yisrael, who explains the prohibition of Shabbat observance for non-Jews in the following way: in Rabbinic literature we find the idea that there is no astrological influence on Israel but there is on the nations. The Abarbanel explains this as the reason why Jews are not allowed to ascribe power to any other thing than God (as He is the only influence in their lives). Therefore since Jews are exclusively devoted to God, and since God rests on Shabbat, they are required to rest as well. Non-Jews however, are allowed to ascribe influence to other beings in addition to God since they are under the influence of the stars/spheres. These stars/spheres are however in continual movement, therefore non-Jews are not allowed to rest either. If you are already as uncomfortable as I am was when reading this, bear with the Chemdat Yisrael a bit more: if a non-Jew were to commit himself exclusively to God, and ascribe influence to Him alone, it would be allowed and even fitting (!) for him to rest on Shabbat like his Maker does.

As with anything in Judaism, there are more opinions on the matter but I think this gives a nice glimpse into how several poskim (jewish legal decisors) have dealt with our topic. I think this also provides a good reminder not to take answers limited to ‘yes’ or ‘no’ at face value, theres a whole chain of thought linked to these answers which if omitted will certainly yield the wrong impression. Like I said before, this blogpost should only be a glimpse of this process but the serious student will take this is as a springboard into greater study.

I also think this shows that there is real room for non-Jews to relate to the God of Israel beyond the mere bones of the 7 categories, though there is no pressure in doing so. Furthermore, an understanding of these provisions yields in my opinion a picture of great inclusiveness and sensitivity to the needs and abilities of mankind who is created in the image of God.

Prayer and Non-Jews

A cursory look at the 7 laws of Noah may lead one to think that its not very comprehensive and can in a sense be kept by any civilized person. Over the course of my studies I have however learned that theres much to depth to these categories of laws and the obligations of a son of Noah in halacha are much larger than would appear at face value.

One of the basic needs of a religious life would seem to be prayer, at least in Islam it is counted as one of the five pillars of its religious requirements and I am sure no serious Christian would dispute the obligatory nature of prayer. This basic need seems however to be absent among the 7 laws of Noah.

Fortunately the question whether non-Jews are commanded in prayer has already been asked by someone and answered by the great Rav Moshe Feinstein in his Igros Moshe (OH 2:25). What follows is a summary of some of the points he makes but no subsitution for the full force of his response.

He starts out by saying that its clearly not numbered among the 7 commandments of the sons of Noah and neither mentioned by the Rambam when he details the obligations for the sons of Noah in the ninth chapter of the Laws of Kings (note: he says obligations, he is of course aware of what the Rambam accords to Adam and the Patriarchs). But, he notes, we find in the Tanach the statement: “my house, shall be called a house of prayer to all nations”, which would seem to yield a connection between non-Jews and prayer. And to be clear, this does not refer to converts as Rashi adds: “and not to Israel alone”.

So it seems to be that even though non-Jews are exempted from prayer, when praying to God they fufill a mitzvah nonetheless and get reward for this. Reward like one who is not commanded but does (i.e. lesser reward than one who is commanded and does). He squares this with the prohibition for a non-Jew to invent a commandment or to act like he is commanded in something with the words of the Radbaz who says that a non-Jew is allowed to do additional commandments as long as he comes as one who is not commanded (i.e. realizes that he is not obligated).

Does this mean that non-Jews are exempt from any requirement to pray? According to Rav Moshe this exemption refers only to fixed prayers but not to prayers that are formed in a time of need or distress; when one is sick (or for a sick person) or for sustenance, these he says, are obligatory for non-Jews as well.

The reason that this is not counted among the 7 laws is because it is a principle of faith in God; to pray to Him and expect all from Him. Belief in God is also not counted among the 7 but the Rambam says explicitly that one who does not believe the commandments derive from God (which requires one to believe in Him first), is not among the pious of the nations and when doing any of the 7 is not counted as having fulfilled them.

So even though it appears not to feature among the 7 laws of Noah, there is an obligation for non-Jews to pray to God in times of distress or need and to expect everything from Him. When doing so they are rewarded like one who is commanded and does. Regarding fixed prayers, these are allowed as long as the person realizes that he is not obligated in them and the reward is like one who is not commanded but does.

One drink, two drinks, …

So tonight its new years eve and there are going to be quite some people that will consume a drink or two, at least I am:)

As with almost anything, Jewish law has something to say about this and I thought it would be nice to relate a halacha that will be applicable.

The Rambam in the Laws of Prayer and the Priestly benediction 4:17 wrote:

שכור אל יתפלל מפני שאין לו כוונה ואם התפלל תפלתו תועבה לפיכך חוזר ומתפלל כשיתרוקן משכרותו. שתוי אל יתפלל ואם התפלל תפלתו תפלה. אי זה שכור זה שאינו יכול לדבר לפני המלך. שתוי יכול לדבר בפני המלך ואינו משתבש. אף על פי כן הואיל ושתה רביעית יין לא יתפלל עד שיסיר יינו מעליו

“A drunkard should not pray because he has no intention (kavanah) and if he prays, his prayer is an abomination, therefore he should return and pray when he is sober again. A person that is tipsy should not pray but if he prays his prayer is prayer (i.e. its acceptable). Who is a drunk person? One that cannot speak before a king. A tipsy person is one that can speak before a king and does not make mistakes [when talking]. Even though this is so [even] when he drinks a riv’it of wine (80-160 ml or 2.8-5.4 fl oz) he should not pray until the [effect of the] wine is removed from him.”

So it seems if you drink a a few glasses of champagne tonight make sure you have said your prayers before that or wait until you feel the effect is gone. If you are tipsy you shouldnt pray but in the event you do so, its OK. However if you get drunk you should not recite prayers because instead of praising God this will be an abomination. The best way is probably to say the prayers before you get to the drinks in which case you are safe.

Rationale for observing commandments other than the 7

Those who read my blog know that I have been looking for some time for a way to explain my wish to observe commandments I havent been commanded in. The whole notion of voluntarily observing a commandment seems kind of a contradiction. Most people perform commandments because they are: commanded in it, expect some kind of reward/punishment, or because its a custom of their community. In my case the first and last definitely not apply, and being punished for not observing something you have not been asked to do seems kind of harsh.

Alot of questions related to observing mitzvot (commandments) other than the 7 that are obligatory I have tried to find answers to, through the internet or talks with other people. But most of the Jewish websites I frequented gave very incomplete answers and the pragmatic approach by others was often very inconsistent.

A good friend of mine however has over the last couple of months guided me through the relevant sources that deal with these topics. It has been truly amazing, to see how the great halachists (Jewish law decisors) deal with questions like mine and a great delight to be able, with help, to read these myself.

One of the first texts we studied was an article by R. Mayer Twersky titled “On the matter of the sons of Noah fulfilling the 613 commandments” which can be found overhere.

One of his paragraphs was very enlightening and expressed something that I have been feeling for quite some time but did not know how to put to words. His comments are specifically referring to the Rambam in Hilchot Melachim 8:11 who wrote:

כל המקבל שבע מצות ונזהר לעשותן הרי זה מחסידי אומות העולם. ויש לו חלק לעולם הבא. והוא שיקבל אותן ויעשה אותן מפני שצוה בהן הקב”ה בתורה והודיענו על ידי משה רבינו שבני נח מקודם נצטוו בהן

“Anyone who accepts the 7 commandments and is careful to do them, behold he is from the pious of the nations. And he has a place in the world to come. And this is one who accepts them and does them because the Holy One blessed be He commanded them in the Torah and made them known by Moses our master that the sons of Noah were before commanded in them.”

R. Twersky writes on this:

ההודאה בנבואת מרע”ה ובצווי הקב”ה אינו בגדר תנאי קודם למעשה, אלא מגוף קיום המצוה. קיום המצוה
מתבצע בזה שמקבל עליו עול מצוות, מודה בצווי ה’ ע”י מרע”ה, ועושה כדברי הצווי. כלומר, עצם הקיום הוא ההודאה בצווי הקב”ה ע”י מרע”ה, והעשיה כדברי הצווי ההוא

“[...] the acceptance of the prophecy of Moses our master, peace be upon him, and the command of the Holy One blessed be He, is not in the category of a condition before the action, rather it is the essence of the fulfillment of the commandment. The fulfillment of the commandment is accomplished in this; that he accepts on himself the yoke of the commandments, accepting the command of Hashem by means of Moses our master, peace be upon him, and he does like the words of the command.” p. 3

So he says that a one who is not obligated in a certain commandment, but wants to perform it can still fulfill it, in this case there is no object of the commandment, but rather the deed is in itself the acceptance of the God of Israel. He notes further that this is the main difference with one who is obligated and fulfills the commandment, in which case there is an object of the commandment, and the fulfillment is the doing of that object.

Allah Akbar

I have always been taught that its not proper for a Christian to say Allah when referring to God because Allah was really the God of the Muslims and not the same God as ours. It was only when I learned that the word Allah is likely to be related etymologically to Eloka (the Hebrew for God) that I started to doubt this.

I asked a Jewish friend in Turkey whether they ever refer to God as Allah and she told me she does but not in prayers.

Another Jewish friend showed me this incredible response by Rav Kook:

[...] in the matter that Muslims are particular (require), the slaughterer to say “Allah Akbar”  before the slaugthering. The poskim have already written, in the case that its impossible in another way, and there is a loss for Jews, because they [muslims] wont buy certain non-kosher animals, that there is no particularity in this, to say this before the blessing, or to make effort that one blesses over chicken first, if they are particular that it should be specifically after the blessing, in order that there will be no interruption between the blessing and the slaughtering. Daat Cohen 10:1

So for those who didnt follow, the case is a Jewish butcher who has Islamic customers, these customers will only purchase the meat if the phrase ‘Allah Akbar’ is pronounced before slaughtering. From a Jewish perspective an appropriate blessing must also be said before slaughtering the animal and preferably there should be no interruption between the blessing and the deed. The Muslims however also prefer there to be no interruption so the poskim have suggested that in order to appease the Muslims, one slaughters another animal before the animal that the Muslim wants to buy so that there wont be an interruption and everyone is happy. The amazing thing however in this response is that R. Kook and other halachic decisors have ruled that a Jew can say ‘Allah Akbar’ before slaughtering if that is the only way that the meat will be bought. Clearly then Allah is appropriate to be used when referring to God.

This is furthermore confirmed in the Ben Ish Chai who was a major decisor in Jewish Law as well. In relating what one may not think about or speak about when in the bathroom he says that its not allowed to say ‘Allah’ when in the bathroom because it is the name for God in Arabic (שהוא שם שמים בלשון ערבי, see here, no.16).

Contradicting Ones Parents

While growing up I have several times heard my father utter his frustration with how different he would relate to his father as compared to how we relate to him. This comes mainly to expression in arguments, which he says were virtually non-existent in the culture he comes from (Middle East). I have seen this with my cousins, less so with the ones that live in urban settings but to a very large extent with those that live in more primitive settings. These cousins would hardly ever contradict their father, or even speak up when in his presence.

This is a far cry from my situation and I would guess for a lot of people in the Netherlands, and presumably other Western countries as well. It seems to be considered a virtue to speak and stand up for one’s own opinion and to be critical of traditional opinions. There certainly is something good about critical reasoning but when it comes to honouring one’s parents I think the way this can be expressed could be more sensitive and at least in my situation reflection was due.

While studying the laws honouring parents with a very knowledgable friend, he showed me this section in the Aruch Hashulchan that deals with contradicting one’s parents and I think the discussion is quite relevant.

12) It is taught in Kiddushin 31b: “and dont contradict his words and dont weigh/evaluate him”, and Rashi says [on this statement:] “[in a situation where] there were his father and someone wiser [than him] arguing in a matter of halacha, he should not say “the words of that man seem right to me”".

But this is quite obvious because if that person contradicts his father, agreeing with him, would amount to contradicting.

And the Tur wrote in the name of the Rema that its not necessary to say [something] contradicting his words, rather even if it appears to him that the words of his father are correct, he should not say “it appears to me that the words of my father are right” for it will appear like he is evaluating the words of his father, rather if he has an answer to resolve the argument, he should give it. And its also forbidden to say “it appears to me like the words of that man” for this is also [implicitly] contradicting  the words of his father.

The mere fact of showing agreement implies that its possible to disagree as well, and this would amount to evaluating or weighing his fathers words, whether they are correct or not. My friend added that this should be read as saying that you should put forth your answer without saying that you agree or not. What matters is that you are not being explicit about it, though of course from your position they might infer whether you agree or disagree.

Continuing:

And all this [applies] only in his presence but when not in his presence, behold we find in the Gemara that R. Elazar in the name of R. Shimon argues his father['s opinion] (Shabbat 44a). And Mar son of R. Ishi said “This statement of my father dates from his youth” (Gittin 29b), and the Rambam argues his father’s words in the comments of his father in the law concerning slaughtering 10 (see there), and the Tur on the Rosh [the Tur was the son of the Rosh],

So all these examples show how Rabbi’s in the Talmud and in other places are recorded to disagree with the views held by their fathers.

[...] and [furthermore] how is it possible to say that [one should] not argue concerning laws with his father, is not the Torah of God and it is the Torah of truth, and we dont flatter regarding it [i.e. we do not distort it so as not to offend someone], and [so] even though in his presence the son can argue with the father and to ask difficulties and settle them and to make the halacha stand on its intention, and there are many places in the Gemara that the son asks a difficulty to his father and he settles it  (see Eruvin 102b, Sanhedrin 80b), and thus is the way of the Torah.

The whole point of these arguments are to arrive at the correct interpretation or application of the Torah so it would be rather farfetched to suggest that one refrains from holding the correct opinions out of respect for one’s parents.

And there are those who say that to contradict his words  is forbidden even when not in his presence, and this suprises me from what was brought to us from Mar son of R. Ishi [quoted above]. Rather in his presence it is forbidden to speak  in contradictive fashion for this is not the way of honouring, rather he should make arguments back and forth with him until one concedes to the other, and additionally if the son’s thoughts remain different, he should keep it in his heart and should not say to him, “the explanation appears to me not to be like your words”.

So it appears that one can speak up his mind but never explicitly state that his father’s opinon is wrong or convey that he is doubting his words. Rather there can be arguing back and forth and asking questions about his father’s understanding until he or his father concedes, and if noone concedes the son should just keep it to himself.

I thought this was a very neat explanation of the sources and how to practically deal with this. Being sensitive in this area, especially when you still live at home and have regular arguments about issues, can greatly improve relations. And if that is not a great enough incentive, these words (of whom I forgot the author) might be:

The way you treat your parents, your children will treat you.

Halacha: Encouraging a lesser evil

A few nights ago I studied with the help of a friend another response of Rav Moshe Feinstein to an interesting question that was posed to him.

Background to the question is certain Jewish guys found going clubbing, which apparently is forbidden. The question that is asked is whether it would be permissable to suggest those guys to take off their kippot when going to the club, in order to prevent others from thinking that its permissable to go to a club (as the kippa might indicate the person being observant of the commandments).

Rav Feinstein’s answer is very interesting and my bullet points are definitely not able to express its full value:

1. It is not permitted to tell them to take off their kippot even if wearing a kippa is only a custom (an important one though).

2. The constructive purpose that is envisioned might very well collapse if people know the person, that he actually is an observant person and will therefore not mistake him to be an unobservant person when he goes into the club with an uncovered head.

3. They may in fact get the idea that in order to engage in sinful activities all one needs to do is take off their kipa.

4. It is forbidden to encourage one even in a minor transgression.

5. Rather, one is obligated to see in every man, even sinners, the capability of being taught something and performing it, even if you cannot influence them to observe the whole Torah.

6. A sin performed in public is a desecration of God’s name, hence 1 public sin is 1 desecration of God’s name. Multiple sins in public thus lead to an increase in the desecration of God’s name.

One of the interesting things in this response is his view on people and how he exhorts we should go about with others. Instead of deciding that a person is beyond repentance/repair, we should always remain patient and never hold back from aiding him or her with even a minor commandment. Even if to our mind that will not result in complete repentance.

Link to the response (second page, last column): im_yd_2_33

Halacha: Marihuana

Last week I studied a response by the late Rav Moshe Feinstein with a friend on whether its allowed to smoke Marihuana. Not that I personally have this desire but I know quite a few people that tried it and/or are smoking it and was interested to hear how the Rabbi’s have dealt with this issue.

Here follow the main points he makes in his response:

1. Its not allowed for a host of reasons in the Torah:

1. It damages the body
2. It damages your mind/thinking
3. It prevents you from studying Torah
4. It prevents you from praying
5. It prevents you from doing commandments with the proper intention

2. It creates a very strong desire (its not clear if  he means addiction), to the point that one would forego their primary needs, such as food and drink, to consume it.

1. Such a strong desire one isnt allowed to have for primary needs (like food and drink) let alone for something thats not considered to be a primary need.

3. As parents forbid the use of marihuana, it is will be dishonouring them when doing it. So one would break the great commandment of honouring one’s father and mother by doing so.

4. He refers to the Ramban’s Torah commentary on “to be holy” as an additional point to take in consideration:

“[...] with respect to what He has not commanded, you should likewise take heed to do the good and the right in His eyes, for He loves the good and the right. And this is a great matter. For it is impossible to mention in the Torah all of a person’s actions toward his neighbors and acquaintances, all of his commercial activities, and all social and political institutions.”

5. Its likely that this transgression will lead to other transgressions.

Link to response: im_yd_3_35

Following a Discussion

Today the Ramadan has started and as I am in Turkey and most of my friends are Muslim I went to an Iftar (meal after the sun goes down).

While on our way back we passed a stand with religious books and as I am always interested in books like that I asked one of my friends for the meaning of Tasavvuf which was written on many books.

It turned out to be a book by Mevlana whose very popular in Turkey but I didnt really get what the book is about.

In any case I brought with me my Jordanian roommate and he got into a discussion with my Turkish neighbour about whether its ok to pray to travel to the grave of Mevlana and pray to/through him.

My Jordanian roommate was sure it wasnt allowed while the Turkish thought it was OK.

I heard about debates like this in Judaism and Christianity as well and personally tend to side with the rationalist tradition that forbids this. And apparently in Islam there is also a more rationalist tradition as opposed to more mystical traditions (Sufism).

The discussion was interesting to hear, especially to hear the different arguments that were brought to the table. The ones that allowed prayer to/through Mevlana tried to find analogies to this in the Quran or in the stories about Muhammed while my friend was constantly just saying its not allowed, when a person dies he is dead (makes sense:P) and has therefore no power anymore.

I didnt join the discussion as I dont share the same conviction about the Quran or the Islam and as such have very different arguments that they probably wont accept. And in addition to that I didnt feel like explaining how its possible in Christianity to have Jesus as intermediary to the Father or among some Christians Mary.

Furthermore quoting the Rambam in this context didnt seem like a wise idea:)

But as this is my blog I can quote it freely. I know I quoted this passage before but I really like it. Its a quote on the issue of intermediaries from Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik’s Halakhic Man:

No person, according to the Halakhah (Jewish Law), needs the aid of others in order to approach God. A person needs no advocates or special pleaders. Every individual is assured by the Halakhah that whenever he will knock on the gates of heaven, they will be opened before him. And just as the Halakhah rejects the notion of human intercessors, so, too, it rejects the notion of transcendental intercessors such as angels and seraphim. One of the thirteen principles of faith, formulated by Maimonides, is “that to Him alone it is fitting to pray, and it is not fitting to pray to any being besides Him.” (Halakhic Man, p. 43)

In my opinion this is a very strong passage and it encourages me; the idea that God opens the door to anyone that knocks on it, noone is refused, no matter how far you have gone away from Him.

While for Muslims this month is one of fasting and introspection, for Jews this is also a special month, the month of Elul that leads up to the end of the year with Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. A time of introspection, repentance and [re-]dedication to God.

This is also a time where according to the Alter Rebbe (whose tradition is much less strict about intermediaries) the King is not in the palace but in the field, close to us, so we can approach Him directly and at any time we desire.

Halacha: Bluffing

Bluffing is a tactic that is used often when negotiating something or bargaining a price.

But is it in accordance with Halacha (Jewish Law)?

Rabbi Dr. Aaron Levine, in his book on business ethics, writes about the limits of bluffing in halacha (pp. 65-66), and here follows some of his thoughts:

• “Bluffing conduct violates the imperative in Halakhah that requires an individual who makes a commitment to do so in good faith.”

• Two kinds of bluff: 1. Bluffing that involves deception, 2. Transparent bluff.

• The first is prohibited as the speakers heart does not conform to his mouth and thus the commitment is not done in good faith.

• Second form permitted as its obvious to the other side that it might be bluff and hence entails no deception.

• Model to assess what constitutes permissible bluff is the laws of vows, known in Hebrew as Nedarim, more specifically the Nidrei zeiriezin: “a vow that a person makes solely in order to generate credibility for his bargaining position… a vow [which] is not legally binding on a halakhic level.”

Halacha: Lying for the Sake of Peace

Under certain circumstances the halacha (Jewish law) permits lying, this is based on the following passage from the Talmud:

R. Ile’a further stated in the name of R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon: One may modify a statement in the interests of peace; for it is said in Scripture, Thy father did command etc. so shall ye say unto Joseph: Forgive, I pray thee now, etc. R. Nathan said: It is a commandment; for it is stated in Scripture, And Samuel said: ‘How can I go? If Saul hear it, he will kill me’, etc.

At the School of R. Ishmael it was taught: Great is the cause of peace. Seeing that for its sake even the Holy One, blessed be He, modified a statement; for at first it is written, My lord being old, while afterwards it is written, And I am old. (Yevamot 65b)

The Rabbi’s interpreted these three Bibilical passages as implying that one may lie for the sake of peace.

In the case of Samuel and Saul it was that God commanded Samuel to go and anoint David as future king of Israel while the current king (Saul) was still reigning. Samuel was afraid of Saul finding out and said “How can I go? If Saul hears it, he will kill me”, where upon God responded that he should say he went to sacrifice to God.

So the rationale is that one may alter the truth for the sake of peace. This does not however imply a blank endorsement of lying, in fact there are various things that have to be taken into account before one chooses to do so. Here are a couple*:

• One can only lie when the objective is to end a discord or prevent an actual rift, so its of the utmost importance that peace is the underlying motivation. In fact lying for the sake of peace falls under whats known as “the ways of peace” (דרכי שלום)
• It is only permissible to lie for the sake of peace when the objective cannot be reached without lying. Note that if is possible to be achieved without lying but that would involve a lot of effort, this route is preferable.
• The lie should be a one-shot and not lead to many other lies to cover up the initial lie
• It is prohibited to lie for the sake of peace if that results in the counterparty feeling heavily indebted
• It is prohibited when assessed that upon discovery of the lie the discord would intensify
• Theres debate over whether one may lie about future matters, some hold that it is only allowed with respect to past and present matters while others rule that its allowed for past, present and future.
• One that loves falsehood is prohibited in any case from lying for the sake of peace.

*All sources have been taken from A. Levine, Moral Issues of the Marketplace in Jewish Law (New York: Yashar Books, 2005)

Bo: Mezuzot?

While reading this weeks portion I came across a Rashi that made me wonder about the halacha for affixing mezuzot.

The verse that Rashi commented on was Ex 12:7

They shall take some of its blood and place it on two doorposts and on the lintel upon the houses in which they will eat it

Rashi comments:

UPON THE HOUSES IN WHICH THEY WILL EAT IT – But not upon the lintel and doorposts of a house [used for storing] straw, or a stable in which people do not live.

Though the commandment of affixing mezuzot is not related in this part, when reading the portion in Hebrew for the first time, I associated doorposts with mezuzah, that is: the case with parchment as its simply the same word.

And perhaps there is more than a linguistic connection between these?

At any rate what I was wondering is whether a mezuzah should also be affixed to doorposts of areas that are not inhabited as in basements and storage houses.

From what Ive read there is a debate about it and one side argues that it is not required as those places are not designed for living in (dwelling), while the other side holds that these require mezuzot as well (see Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 11:16). This effectively means that if one does decide to do so, the blessing should not be recited.

I personally have a kosher mezuzah on my doorpost and did recite a blessing over it while affixing it. The blessing goes like this:

Blessed are You, Lord, our God, King of the universe Who has sanctified us with his commandments and commanded us to affix a mezuzah

I enjoyed doing it and everyday when coming home and seeing the mezuzah I thank God for bringing me home and protecting me.

But there is a problem… the problem is that in this blessing it says, “Who commanded us”, where us refers to the Jewish people and hence not to me.

Halachically its simply problematic that I have a mezuzah on my doorpost and perhaps even more that its a kosher one. But I simply refuse to take it off I just like it and it serves as a great reminder to God and His commandments.

There is another sign commandment, the mitzvah of Tefillin. During the time that I was convinced the Torah’s commandments were equally mandatory for me as for the Jewish people, I was waking up every morning putting on tefillin (to the horror of my parents!) but I gave this up after some time when I decided that the mitzvah was not for me but for the Jewish people (and admittedly it was hard every morning waking up like that!).

Still I miss it, I mean it did have something beautiful, praying with a Tallit, Tefillin, and probably to be fully consistent I should take off the mezuzah as well and pray “God of the Fathers” instead of “God of our Fathers”, but I dont really feel like doing this, as at the end of the day while it may be intellectually more consistent, the desire within my heart to bond and commune with God in the way that I feel comfortable with I think is also very – if not more – important.

Are these difficulties recognizable to you? And if so, how do you deal with them?

Halacha: What is Honour?

From time to time I take out my Kitzur Shulchan Aruch to browse some of the laws of Judaism. I mostly look at laws that are applicable to me, which is mostly the sections dealing with laws between man and his friend/neighbour, honouring one’s parents etc.

The Kitzur Shulchan Aruch is in a sense a condensed version of the much larger work titled Shulchan Aruch. The former being prepared by Rabbi Shlomo Ganzfried, the latter being the work of Rabbi Yosef B. Karo who was born in Spain or Portugal in 1488 and died in the year 1575 in Safed.

The chain doesnt stop here though:) The Shulchan Aruch is in a sense a simplified version of the again, larger work called the Beit Yosef, which author is also Rabbi Yosef B. Karo, such that some of my friends when referring to the Shulchan Aruch call its author the Beit Yosef.

The Shulchan Aruch is a codification of Halacha (Jewish Law) that includes Talmudic law and later developments in the Geonim but also early Rishonim as the Rambam, Alfasi and Asher Ben Jechiel. It (more the Beit Yosef) was in a sense undertaken to counter the fact that uneducated man just followed any authority that sat well with them and tried to streamline Judaism as far as it was concerned with Halacha.

This wasnt without struggles but nowadays the Shulchan Aruch is considered to be one of the milestones in the development of Halacha and many use it as a standard in halachic decision-making.

That was all by way of introduction to the halacha I wanted to share. Its from the part that deals with honouring parents and I think very much inspiring.

אֵיזֶהוּ כָבוֹד? מַאֲכִילוֹ וּמַשְׁקֵהוּ, מַלְבִּישׁ וּמְכַסֶּה, מַכְנִיס וּמוֹצִיא. וְּיִתְּנֶנוּ לוֹ בְסֵבֶר פָּנִים יָפוֹת. שֶׁאֲפִלוּ מַאֲכִילוֹ בְּכָל יוֹם פְּטוּמוֹת, וְהֶרְאָה לוֹ פָּנִים זוֹעֲפוֹת, נֶעֱנָשׁ עָלָיו

What is honour? Feeding him, and [providing] his drink, clothing and cover, financial needs and lead him out. And he [the son] shall give a cheerful face. For even if feeding him all day stuffing(?) [him] , and the look on his [the son] face is angry/indignant, he [the son] will be punished.

These all sound very logical, feeding one’s parents and providing them with cover. But the part of doing these cheerful is what makes them in my opinion to fall under the category of honouring one’s parents. I mean we all know how difficult it is, especially as youngsters when our parents ask us to do something, to respond cheerfully.

Just a couple of days ago my mother asked me to clean the house and I immediately responded irritated as I had other things in mind. In the end I did do it but it would have been a greater fulfillment of the commandment if I had responded cheerfully and instead of delaying it doing it the very same moment she asked.

How do you deal with the commandment of honouring your parents?